Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions
Adopted by the Negotiating
Conference on 21 November 1997
Preamble
The Parties,
Considering that bribery is a widespread phenomenon in
international business transactions, including trade and
investment, which raises serious moral and political concerns,
undermines good governance and economic development, and distorts
international competitive conditions;
Considering that all countries share a responsibility
to combat bribery in international business transactions;
Having regard to the Revised Recommendation on
Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions, adopted
by the Council of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) on 23 May 1997, C(97)123/FINAL, which, inter
alia, called for effective measures to deter, prevent and combat
the bribery of foreign public officials in connection with
international business transactions, in particular the prompt
criminalisation of such bribery in an effective and co-ordinated
manner and in conformity with the agreed common elements set out
in that Recommendation and with the jurisdictional and other
basic legal principles of each country;
Welcoming other recent developments which further
advance international understanding and co-operation in combating
bribery of public officials, including actions of the United
Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the
World Trade Organisation, the Organisation of American States,
the Council of Europe and the European Union;
Welcoming the efforts of companies, business
organisations and trade unions as well as other non-governmental
organisations to combat bribery;
Recognising the role of governments in the prevention
of solicitation of bribes from individuals and enterprises in
international business transactions;
Recognising that achieving progress in this field
requires not only efforts on a national level but also
multilateral co-operation, monitoring and follow-up;
Recognising that achieving equivalence among the
measures to be taken by the Parties is an essential object and
purpose of the Convention, which requires that the Convention be
ratified without derogations affecting this equivalence;
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
Article 1
The Offence of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
1. Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to
establish that it is a criminal offence under its law for any
person intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue
pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through
intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official
or for a third party, in order that the official act or refrain
from acting in relation to the performance of official duties, in
order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in
the conduct of international business.
2. Each Party shall take any measures necessary to establish
that complicity in, including incitement, aiding and abetting, or
authorisation of an act of bribery of a foreign public official
shall be a criminal offence. Attempt and conspiracy to bribe a
foreign public official shall be criminal offences to the same
extent as attempt and conspiracy to bribe a public official of
that Party.
3. The offences set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 above are
hereinafter referred to as "bribery of a foreign public
official".
4. For the purpose of this Convention:
a) "foreign public official" means any person
holding a legislative, administrative or judicial office of a
foreign country, whether appointed or elected; any person
exercising a public function for a foreign country, including for
a public agency or public enterprise; and any official or agent
of a public international organisation;
b) "foreign country" includes all levels and
subdivisions of government, from national to local;
c) "act or refrain from acting in relation to the
performance of official duties" includes any use of the
public official.s position, whether or not within the official.s
authorised competence.
Article 2
Responsibility of Legal Persons
Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary, in
accordance with its legal principles, to establish the liability
of legal persons for the bribery of a foreign public
official.
Article 3
Sanctions
1. The bribery of a foreign public official shall be
punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal
penalties. The range of penalties shall be comparable to that
applicable to the bribery of the Party.s own public officials and
shall, in the case of natural persons, include deprivation of
liberty sufficient to enable effective mutual legal assistance
and extradition.
2. In the event that, under the legal system of a Party,
criminal responsibility is not applicable to legal persons, that
Party shall ensure that legal persons shall be subject to
effective, proportionate and dissuasive non-criminal sanctions,
including monetary sanctions, for bribery of foreign public
officials.
3. Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to
provide that the bribe and the proceeds of the bribery of a
foreign public official, or property the value of which
corresponds to that of such proceeds, are subject to seizure and
confiscation or that monetary sanctions of comparable effect are
applicable.
4. Each Party shall consider the imposition of additional
civil or administrative sanctions upon a person subject to
sanctions for the bribery of a foreign public official.
Article 4
Jurisdiction
1. Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction over the bribery of a foreign public
official when the offence is committed in whole or in part in its
territory.
2. Each Party which has jurisdiction to prosecute its
nationals for offences committed abroad shall take such measures
as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction to do so in
respect of the bribery of a foreign public official, according to
the same principles.
3. When more than one Party has jurisdiction over an alleged
offence described in this Convention, the Parties involved shall,
at the request of one of them, consult with a view to determining
the most appropriate jurisdiction for prosecution.
4. Each Party shall review whether its current basis for
jurisdiction is effective in the fight against the bribery of
foreign public officials and, if it is not, shall take remedial
steps.
Article 5
Enforcement
Investigation and prosecution of the bribery of a foreign
public official shall be subject to the applicable rules and
principles of each Party. They shall not be influenced by
considerations of national economic interest, the potential
effect upon relations with another State or the identity of the
natural or legal persons involved.
Article 6
Statute of Limitations
Any statute of limitations applicable to the offence of
bribery of a foreign public official shall allow an adequate
period of time for the investigation and prosecution of this
offence.
Article 7
Money Laundering
Each Party which has made bribery of its own public official a
predicate offence for the purpose of the application of its money
laundering legislation shall do so on the same terms for the
bribery of a foreign public official, without regard to the place
where the bribery occurred.
Article 8
Accounting
1. In order to combat bribery of foreign public officials
effectively, each Party shall take such measures as may be
necessary, within the framework of its laws and regulations
regarding the maintenance of books and records, financial
statement disclosures, and accounting and auditing standards, to
prohibit the establishment of off-the-books accounts, the making
of off-the-books or inadequately identified transactions, the
recording of non-existent expenditures, the entry of liabilities
with incorrect identification of their object, as well as the use
of false documents, by companies subject to those laws and
regulations, for the purpose of bribing foreign public officials
or of hiding such bribery.
2. Each Party shall provide effective, proportionate and
dissuasive civil, administrative or criminal penalties for such
omissions and falsifications in respect of the books, records,
accounts and financial statements of such companies.
Article 9
Mutual Legal Assistance
1. Each Party shall, to the fullest extent possible under its
laws and relevant treaties and arrangements, provide prompt and
effective legal assistance to another Party for the purpose of
criminal investigations and proceedings brought by a Party
concerning offences within the scope of this Convention and for
non-criminal proceedings within the scope of this Convention
brought by a Party against a legal person. The requested Party
shall inform the requesting Party, without delay, of any
additional information or documents needed to support the request
for assistance and, where requested, of the status and outcome of
the request for assistance.
2. Where a Party makes mutual legal assistance conditional
upon the existence of dual criminality, dual criminality shall be
deemed to exist if the offence for which the assistance is sought
is within the scope of this Convention.
3. A Party shall not decline to render mutual legal assistance
for criminal matters within the scope of this Convention on the
ground of bank secrecy.
Article 10
Extradition
1. Bribery of a foreign public official shall be deemed to be
included as an extraditable offence under the laws of the Parties
and the extradition treaties between them.
2. If a Party which makes extradition conditional on the
existence of an extradition treaty receives a request for
extradition from another Party with which it has no extradition
treaty, it may consider this Convention to be the legal basis for
extradition in respect of the offence of bribery of a foreign
public official.
3. Each Party shall take any measures necessary to assure
either that it can extradite its nationals or that it can
prosecute its nationals for the offence of bribery of a foreign
public official. A Party which declines a request to extradite a
person for bribery of a foreign public official solely on the
ground that the person is its national shall submit the case to
its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.
4. Extradition for bribery of a foreign public official is
subject to the conditions set out in the domestic law and
applicable treaties and arrangements of each Party. Where a Party
makes extradition conditional upon the existence of dual
criminality, that condition shall be deemed to be fulfilled if
the offence for which extradition is sought is within the scope
of Article 1 of this Convention.
Article 11
Responsible Authorities
For the purposes of Article 4, paragraph 3, on consultation,
Article 9, on mutual legal assistance and Article 10, on
extradition, each Party shall notify to the Secretary-General of
the OECD an authority or authorities responsible for making and
receiving requests, which shall serve as channel of communication
for these matters for that Party, without prejudice to other
arrangements between Parties.
Article 12
Monitoring and Follow-up
The Parties shall co-operate in carrying out a programme of
systematic follow-up to monitor and promote the full
implementation of this Convention. Unless otherwise decided by
consensus of the Parties, this shall be done in the framework of
the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business
Transactions and according to its terms of reference, or within
the framework and terms of reference of any successor to its
functions, and Parties shall bear the costs of the programme in
accordance with the rules applicable to that body.
Article 13
Signature and Accession
1. Until its entry into force, this Convention shall be open
for signature by OECD Members and by Non-Members which have been
invited to become full participants in its Working Group on
Bribery in International Business Transactions.
2. Subsequent to its entry into force, this Convention shall
be open to accession by any non-signatory which is a member of
the OECD or has become a full participant in the Working Group on
Bribery in International Business Transactions or any successor
to its functions. For each such non-signatory, the Convention
shall enter into force on the sixtieth day following the date of
deposit of its instrument of accession.
Article 14
Ratification and Depositary
1. This Convention is subject to acceptance, approval or
ratification by the Signatories, in accordance with their
respective laws.
2. Instruments of acceptance, approval, ratification or
accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the
OECD, who shall serve as Depositary of this Convention.
Article 15
Entry into Force
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the sixtieth day
following the date upon which five of the ten countries which
have the ten largest export shares set out in
DAFFE/IME/BR(97)18/FINAL (annexed), and which represent by
themselves at least sixty per cent of the combined total exports
of those ten countries, have deposited their instruments of
acceptance, approval, or ratification. For each signatory
depositing its instrument after such entry into force, the
Convention shall enter into force on the sixtieth day after
deposit of its instrument.
2. If, after 31 December 1998, the Convention has not entered
into force under paragraph 1 above, any signatory which has
deposited its instrument of acceptance, approval or ratification
may declare in writing to the Depositary its readiness to accept
entry into force of this Convention under this paragraph 2. The
Convention shall enter into force for such a signatory on the
sixtieth day following the date upon which such declarations have
been deposited by at least two signatories. For each signatory
depositing its declaration after such entry into force, the
Convention shall enter into force on the sixtieth day following
the date of deposit.
Article 16
Amendment
Any Party may propose the amendment of this Convention. A
proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary which
shall communicate it to the other Parties at least sixty days
before convening a meeting of the Parties to consider the
proposed amendment. An amendment adopted by consensus of the
Parties, or by such other means as the Parties may determine by
consensus, shall enter into force sixty days after the deposit of
an instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval by all of
the Parties, or in such other circumstances as may be specified
by the Parties at the time of adoption of the amendment.
Article 17
Withdrawal
A Party may withdraw from this Convention by submitting
written notification to the Depositary. Such withdrawal shall be
effective one year after the date of the receipt of the
notification. After withdrawal, co-operation shall continue
between the Parties and the Party which has withdrawn on all
requests for assistance or extradition made before the effective
date of withdrawal which remain pending.
Annex
Statistics on OECD Exports
|
1990.-1996.
US$ million
|
1990.-1996.
|
1990.-1996.
|
|
|
% of Total OCDE
|
% of 10 largest
|
United States
|
287 118
|
15,9%
|
19,7%
|
Germany
|
254 746
|
14,1%
|
17,5%
|
Japan
|
212 665
|
11,8%
|
14,6%
|
France
|
138 471
|
7,7%
|
9,5%
|
United Kingdom
|
121 258
|
6,7%
|
8,3%
|
Italy
|
112 449
|
6,2%
|
7,7%
|
Canada
|
91 215
|
5,1%
|
6,3%
|
Corea(1)
|
81 364
|
4,5%
|
5,6%
|
Netherlands
|
81 264
|
4,5%
|
5,6%
|
Belgium- Luxemburg
|
78 598
|
4,4%
|
5,4%
|
Total 10
largest
|
1 459
148
|
81,0%
|
100%
|
|
|
|
|
Spain
|
42 469
|
2,4%
|
|
Switzerland
|
40 395
|
2,2%
|
|
Sweden
|
36 710
|
2,0%
|
|
Mexico(1)
|
34 233
|
1,9%
|
|
Australia
|
27 194
|
1,5%
|
|
Denmark
|
24 145
|
1,3%
|
|
Austria*
|
22 432
|
1,2%
|
|
Norway
|
21 666
|
1,2%
|
|
Ireland
|
19 217
|
1,1%
|
|
Finland
|
17 296
|
1,0%
|
|
Poland (1)**
|
12 652
|
0,7%
|
|
Portugal
|
10 801
|
0,6%
|
|
Turkey*
|
8 027
|
0,4%
|
|
Hungary**
|
6 795
|
0,4%
|
|
New Zealand
|
6 663
|
0,4%
|
|
Czech Republic***
|
6 263
|
0,3%
|
|
Greece*
|
4 606
|
0,3%
|
|
Iceland
|
949
|
0,1%
|
|
Total
OECD
|
1 801
661
|
100%
|
|
Notes: * 1990-1995; ** 1991-1996;
*** 1993-1996
Source: OECD, (1) IMF
Concerning Belgium-Luxembourg:
Trade statistics for Belgium and Luxembourg are available only on
a combined basis for the two countries. For purposes of Article
15, paragraph 1 of the Convention, if either Belgium or
Luxembourg deposits its instrument of acceptance, approval or
ratification, or if both Belgium and Luxembourg deposit their
instruments of acceptance, approval or ratification, it shall be
considered that one of the countries which have the ten largest
exports shares has deposited its instrument and the joint exports
of both countries will be counted towards the 60 per cent of
combined total exports of those ten countries, which is required
for entry into force under this provision.